Abstract-This paper focuses on the cross-layer issue of joint multiuser detection and resource allocation for energy efficiency in wireless code-division multiple-access (CDMA) networks. In particular, assuming that a linear multiuser detector is adopted in the uplink receiver, the situation considered is that in which each terminal is allowed to vary its transmit power, spreading code, and uplink receiver in order to maximize its own utility, which is defined as the ratio of data throughput to transmit power. Applying a game-theoretic formulation, a non-cooperative game for utility maximization is formulated, and it is proved that a unique Nash equilibrium exists, which, under certain conditions, is also Pareto-optimal. Theoretical results concerning the relationship between the problems of signal-to-interferenceplus noise ratio (SINR) maximization and mean-square error (MSE) minimization are given, and, by applying the tools of large system analysis, a new distributed power control algorithm is implemented, based on very little prior information about the user of interest. The utility profile achieved by the active users in a large CDMA system is also computed, and, moreover, the centralized socially optimal solution is analyzed. Considerations concerning the extension of the proposed framework to a multicell scenario are also briefly detailed. Simulation results confirm that the proposed non-cooperative game largely outperforms competing alternatives, and that it exhibits negligible performance loss with respect to the socially optimal solution, and only in the case in which the number of users exceeds the processing gain. Finally, results also show an excellent agreement between the theoretical closed-form formulas based on large system analysis and the outcome of numerical experiments.
optimal multiuser detector, the impact of fading on multiuser detection structures, the synthesis of adaptive, possibly blind, multiuser detection algorithms, and the joint multiuser detection and channel equalization problem, have been thoroughly investigated. Results regarding these and other research issues are surveyed in the textbooks [1] , [2] . In the recent past, a new trend has emerged, i.e. the so-called cross-layer approach. Roughly speaking, the basic idea here is to perform joint optimization of procedures that are implemented in different layers of the network protocol stack, so as to outperform solutions based on individual optimization of the procedures of each network layer. Regarding CDMA systems, the cross layer approach has focused mainly on the problem of integrating physical layer issues, such as multiuser detection and channel estimation, with network level issues, such as call admission control, power control, and, more generally, resource allocation [3] . In keeping with this recent trend, this paper focuses on the issue of joint multiuser detection and resource allocation in order to achieve energy efficiency in wireless CDMA networks. The results of this paper are based on two powerful mathematical tools, namely game theory and large system analysis.
Game theory [4] is a branch of mathematics that has been applied primarily in economics and other social sciences to study the interactions among several autonomous subjects with contrasting interests. More recently, it has also been used in the design and analysis of communication systems, mostly with application to resource allocation algorithms [5] , and, in particular, to power control [6] . As examples, the reader is referred to [7] [8] [9] . In these papers, for a multiple access wireless data network, noncooperative and cooperative games are introduced, wherein each user chooses its transmit power in order to maximize its own utility, defined as the ratio of throughput to transmit power. While the above-noted studies consider the issue of power control assuming that a conventional matched filter is available at the receiver, the recent paper [10] considers the cross-layer problem of joint linear receiver design and power control so as to maximize the utility of each user; it is thus shown in [10] that the inclusion of receiver design in the considered game brings remarkable advantages. This same utility function is also used in [11] for energy-efficient power control in ultra-wideband (UWB) communications, while the survey paper [12] reviews recent advances in the application of a game-theoretic framework for energy-efficient resource allocation.
Large system analysis (LSA) is a relatively new mathematical tool, first introduced in [13] , that has emerged in the analysis of CDMA systems. In summary, [13] has revealed 0733-8716/08/$25.00 c 2008 IEEE that in a CDMA system with processing gain and number of users both increasing without bound but with their ratio fixed, and with randomly chosen, unit-norm, spreading codes, the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) of each user for the case in which a linear minimum mean square error (MMSE) receiver is adopted converges in probability to a nonrandom constant. In particular, denoting by K the number of active users, by N the system processing gain, by N 0 /2 the additive thermal noise power spectral density (PSD) level, and by E P [·] the expectation with respect to the limiting empirical distribution F of the received powers of the interferers, the SINR of the MMSE receiver for the k-th user, say γ k , converges in probability, for K, N → ∞ with K/N = α, to a constant, say γ * k , the unique solution of the equation
where P k is the received power of the k-th user. Interestingly, the limiting SINR depends only on the limiting empirical distribution of the received powers of the interferers, the load α, the thermal noise level and the received power of the user of interest, while being independent of the actual realization of the received powers of the interferers and of the spreading codes of the active users. LSA is now a well-established mathematical tool for design and analysis of communication systems (see, e.g., [14] [15] [16] , to cite a few).
A. Summary of the results
This paper is the first in this area that considers the crosslayer issue of utility maximization with respect to the choice of linear multiuser detector, spreading code and transmit power. Using game theory and LSA, the following contributions are given here.
-We generalize the non-cooperative game considered in [10] by considering utility maximization with respect to the linear uplink multiuser receiver, transmit power and spreading code assignment. We will show that the newly considered non-cooperative game admits a unique Nash equilibrium, which, for the case in which the number of users does not exceed the system processing gain, is also Pareto-optimal. -As an introductory step to the previous item, we also formulate a non-cooperative game for SINR maximization with respect to linear multiuser detector and spreading code choice, and show that this game admits a unique Nash equilibrium point that is also Pareto-optimal. -Using LSA, we design a new distributed power control algorithm that needs very little prior information (i.e., the channel gain for the user of interest) to be implemented. This algorithm may be integrated into the utility maximizing non-cooperative game of [10] . -Using LSA, we are able to predict the utility and SINR profile across users in a large CDMA system, for both the cases in which spreading code optimization is either considered or not considered. -Using LSA, we are able to derive the socially optimal solution to the problem of utility maximization with equal SINR constraint; numerical results will show that the performance loss incurred by the proposed noncooperative game with respect to the socially optimum solution is negligible. -We also consider the extension of our framework to a multi-cell scenario. In particular, we consider the issue of non-cooperative utility maximization in a multi-cell system with predetermined base station assignment, and show that, when the number of users does not exceed the processing gain, this game admits a Nash equilibrium which is also Pareto-optimal.
B. Outline of the paper
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section contains some preliminaries on the considered payoff function and on the system model of interest. Section III touches on the definitions of Nash equilibrium and Pareto optimality, and, also, provides an interesting result on the equilibrium point of the SINR-maximizing non-cooperative game. In Section IV the non-cooperative game for utility maximization with respect to the choice of linear multiuser detection, power control and spreading code is described and analyzed. LSA is used in Section V to derive a distributed power control procedure that can be implemented based on little prior information; it is shown that this algorithm may be used to obtain distributed implementations of the noncooperative game proposed in [10] . In Section VI, LSA is used in order to predict the SINR and utility profile across users in a large CDMA system, while Section VII contains the discussion on the socially optimum, equal SINR, cooperative game. Section VIII considers the extension of the considered non-cooperative games to a multi-cell scenario, wherein outof-cell interference is properly taken into account. Finally, numerical results are illustrated in Section IX, while Section X contains our conclusions.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
Consider the uplink of a K-user synchronous, single-cell, direct-sequence code division multiple access (DS/CDMA) network with processing gain N and subject to flat fading. After chip-matched filtering and sampling at the chip-rate, the N -dimensional received data vector, say r, corresponding to one symbol interval, can be written as
wherein p k is the transmit power of the k-th user 1 , b k ∈ {−1, 1} is the information symbol of the k-th user, and h k is the real 2 channel gain between the k-th user's transmitter and the access point (AP); the actual value of h k depends on both the distance of the k-th user's terminal from the AP and the channel fading fluctuations. The N -dimensional vector s k is the spreading code of the k-th user; we assume that the entries of s k are real and that s
transpose. Finally, n is the ambient noise vector, which we assume to be a zero-mean white Gaussian random process with covariance matrix (N 0 /2)I N , with I N the identity matrix of order N . An alternative and compact representation of (2) is given by r = SP 1/2 Hb + n , Assume now that each mobile terminal sends its data in packets of M bits, and that it is interested both in having its data received with as small as possible error probability at the AP, and in making careful use of the energy stored in its battery. Obviously, these are conflicting goals, since error-free reception may be achieved by increasing the received SNR, i.e. by increasing the transmit power, which of course comes at the expense of battery life 3 . A useful approach to quantify these conflicting goals is to define the utility of the k-th user as the ratio of its throughput, defined as the number of information bits that are received with no error in unit time, to its transmit power [7] , [8] , i.e.
Note that u k is measured in bit/Joule, i.e. it represents the number of successful bit transmissions that can be made for each Joule of energy drained from the battery. The utility function (4) is widely accepted and indeed it has been already used in a number of previous studies such as [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] . Of course, there are also alternative choices that could be made. For instance, papers [17] , [18] consider an outage-based utility suited for rapidly time-varying channels, while the recent study [19] considers a utility that is the product of the transmit power times the interference 4 . Utility (4), however, is by no doubt the most suited one when energy efficiency is to be taken into account, and from now on we will use this model.
Denoting by R the common rate of the network (extension to the case in which each user transmits with its own rate R k is quite simple) and assuming that each packet of M symbols contains L information symbols and M −L overhead symbols, reserved, e.g., for channel estimation and/or parity checks, the throughput T k can be expressed as
wherein E k denotes the probability that a packet from the k-th user is received error-free. In the considered DS/CDMA setting, the term E k depends formally on a number of parameters such as the spreading codes of all the users and the diagonal entries of the matrices P and H, as well as on the strength of the used error correcting codes. However, a customary approach is to model the multiple access interference as a Gaussian random process, and assume that E k is an increasing function of the k-th user's SINR γ k , which is naturally the case in many practical situations. Recall that, for the case in which a linear receiver is used to detect the data symbol b k , according, i.e., to the decision rule
with b k the estimate of b k and d k the N -dimensional vector representing the receive filter for the user k, it is easily seen that the SINR γ k can be written as
Of related interest is also the mean square error (MSE) for the user k, which, for a linear receiver, is defined as The exact shape of E k (γ k ) depends on factors such as the modulation and coding type. However, in all cases of relevant interest, it is an increasing function of γ k with a sigmoidal shape, and converges to unity as γ k → +∞; as an example, for binary phase-shift-keying (BPSK) modulation coupled with no channel coding, it is easily shown that
with Q(·) the complementary cumulative distribution function of a zero-mean Gaussian random variate with unit variance. A plot of (9) is shown in Fig. 1 for the case M = 100. It should be noted that substituting (9) into (5), and, in turn, into (4), leads to a strong incongruence. Indeed, for p k → 0, we have γ k → 0, but E k converges to a small but non-zero value (i.e. 2 −M ), thus implying that an unboundedly large utility can be achieved by transmitting with zero power, i.e. not transmitting at all and making blind guesses at the receiver on what data were transmitted. To circumvent this problem, a customary approach [8] , [10] is to replace E k with an efficiency function, say f k (γ k ), whose behavior should approximate as close as possible that of E k , except that for
For example, in the BPSK case of (9), the function f (γ k ) = (1 − e −γ k ) M is a widely accepted substitute for the true probability of correct packet reception 5 . Note that this particular efficiency function is increasing and S-shaped (i.e, there is a point below which is is convex and above which it is concave), converges to unity as γ k approaches infinity, and has a continuous first order derivative. It turns out that these are the salient analytical properties needed for our analysis, and in the sequel, we will Comparison of probability of error-free packet reception and efficiency function versus receive SINR and for packet size M = 100. Note the S-shape of both functions.
assume a generic efficiency function f having these particular properties, returning to the particular choice for BPSK in our numerical studies in Section IX. Note that we have now omitted the subscript "k on f ; i.e. we will use the notation f (γ k ) in place of f k (γ k ), assuming that the efficiency function is the same for all the users. (The more general case of userdependent efficiency functions can be treated similarly, but adds undue notational complexity without significantly adding to the generality of the results.)
Summing up, substituting (5) into (4) and replacing the probability E k with the above defined efficiency function, we obtain the following expression for the k-th user's utility:
Now, based on the utility definition (10), many interesting questions arise concerning how each user may maximize its utility, and how this maximization affects utilities achieved by other users. Likewise, it is natural to question what happens in a non-cooperative setting wherein each user autonomously and selfishly tries to maximize its own utility, with no care for other users utilities. In particular, in this latter situation, is the system able to reach an equilibrium wherein no user is interested in varying its parameters since each action it would take would lead to a decrease in its own utility? And, also, what is the price to be paid in terms of performance loss due to the selfish behavior (i.e., lack of cooperation) of the users? Game theory provides means to study these interactions and to provide some useful and insightful answers to these questions.
Initially, game theory was applied in this context mainly as a tool to study non-cooperative scenarios wherein mobile users are allowed to vary their transmit power only (see [7] [8] [9] , for example) to maximize utility, and where conventional matched filtering is used at the receiver. Recently, instead, in [10] such an approach has been extended to the cross layer scenario in which each user may vary its power and its uplink linear receiver, i.e. the problem of joint linear multiuser detection optimization and power control for utility maximization has been tackled. In the following, we will go further by considering and analyzing the case of spreading code choice, power control and linear multiuser detector design for utility maximization.
A. The proposed non-cooperative game
Formally, the game G proposed here can be described as
is the set of active users participating in the game, u k is the k-th user's utility defined in (10) , and
is the set of possible actions (strategies) that user k can take. It is seen that S k is written as the Cartesian product of three different sets, and indeed [0, P k,max ] is the range of available transmit powers for the k-th user (note that P k,max is the maximum allowed transmit power for user k), R N , with R the real line, defines the set of all possible linear receive filters, and, finally,
defines the set of the allowed spreading codes 6 for user k. Summing up, the proposed non-cooperative game to be considered in the following can be cast as the following maximization problem
III. PRELIMINARY RESULTS AND CONCEPTS
Before proceeding further, we review here some basic definitions on game theory, and provide some results on the relationship between SINR maximization and MSE minimization in multiuser systems. The contents of this section will be useful in the sequel.
A. Nash equilibria and Pareto optimality
We give here the definition of Nash equilibrium. Let
Otherwise stated, at a Nash equilibrium, no user can unilaterally improve its own utility by taking a different strategy. A quick reading of this definition might lead to think that at Nash equilibrium users' utilities achieve their maximum values. Actually, this is not the case, since the existence of a Nash equilibrium point does not imply that no other strategy K-tuple exists that can lead to an improvement of the utilities of some users while not decreasing the utilities of the remaining ones. These latter strategies are usually said to be Pareto-optimal [4] . Otherwise stated, at a Nash equilibrium, each user, provided that the other users' strategies do not change, is not interested in changing its own strategy. However, if some sort of cooperation would be available, users might agree to simultaneously switch to a different strategy Ktuple, so as to improve the utility of some, if not all, active users, while not decreasing the utility of the remaining ones.
B. SINR maximization and MSE minimization
We are now ready to state our first result. Proposition 1: Given the linear decision rule (6) and the SINR expression in (7) , consider the non-cooperative game
with the constraint s k = 1. This game admits a unique 7 
Nash equilibrium point, which coincides with the unique global minimizer (with respect to spreading code choice and linear receiver choice) of the total MSE (TMSE) defined as
Moreover, the Nash equilibrium point is also Pareto-optimal. Proof: This proof is partly based on results that are scattered in other papers; for the sake of conciseness and to avoid useless reproduction of already known material, we use these results citing their origin but without proving them again. First of all, recall that among linear multiuser detectors, the MMSE receiver is the one that maximizes the SINR of each user [2] , thus implying that, in order to maximize its own SINR, each user will adopt a linear MMSE receiver, i.e. we have
into (7), and using linear algebra, it is easily shown that
Given (15), it is seen that the k-th user SINR is maximized by setting s k equal to the eigenvector corresponding to the minimal eigenvalue of the covariance matrix of the k-th user'
So far nothing guarantees that this strategy leads to a stable equilibrium point. On the other hand, if a linear MMSE receiver is used, the following relation is well-known to hold
thus implying that SINR maximization for the generic k-th user is equivalent to minimization of its MSE. Moreover, exploiting the results contained in the Appendix I of [20] , it can be shown that, in the considered setting, individual MSE minimization is equivalent to minimization of the TMSE, defined in (14) . Following [21] [22] [23] , letting
and denoting by (·) + Moore-Penrose pseudoinversion, it can 7 Here and in the following uniqueness of the linear receive filter d k is meant up to a positive scaling factor. Uniqueness of the spreading codes is instead intended with respect to the set of eigenvalues of the matrix SHP H T S T .
be shown that the TMSE admits a unique global optimum, and that the iterations
admit as unique stable fixed points spreading code sets that are the global minimizer of the total MSE. In the above relations, µ i should be set so that s i = 1, and a procedure for efficiently finding the value of µ i for ensuring this constraint is given in Appendix A.
So far, we have shown that the non-cooperative game in (13) can be solved by minimizing, through iterations (17), the total MSE, and that these iterations are guaranteed to converge to the unique and stable global optimum, i.e. the non-cooperative game admits a Nash equilibrium. It remains to show the Pareto-optimality of this point. To this end, it suffices to show that, lettingS andD be the spreading code matrix and the linear receiver matrix that jointly achieve the global minimum of the total MSE, no strategy of spreading codes and decoder can be found to increase the SINR of one or more users without decreasing the SINR of at least one other user. To see this, note that ifS andD are the global minimizers of the MSE, thenD contains the MMSE receivers resulting from the spreading codes ofS. Denote by
the SINR values achieved by the matricesS andD. Assume now that there exists a spreading code matrix S * =S such
If this is the case, we can make an MMSE update and obtain the matrix D * of the MMSE receivers corresponding to the codes in S * .
For a given set of spreading codes, using the MMSE receiver always yields a maximization of the SINR and a minimization of the MSE. We thus have
which contradicts the starting assumptions thatS andD are the global minimizers of the MSE.
IV. A NON-COOPERATIVE GAME FOR CROSS-LAYER RESOURCE ALLOCATION
Equipped with the above result, we are now ready to resume consideration of the non-cooperative game in (12) . Note that, given (10), the above maximization can be also written as
Moreover, since the efficiency function is monotone and nondecreasing, we also have
i.e. we can first take care of SINR maximization with respect to spreading codes and linear receivers, and then focus on maximization of the resulting utility with respect to transmit power.
We are now ready to express our result on the noncooperative game for spreading code optimization, linear receiver design and power control. (17) . Denote by γ * k the corresponding SINR. Moreover, for K ≤ N , the Nash equilibrium point is Paretooptimal. Proof: The proof generalizes the one provided in [10] , so, for the sake of brevity, we mainly focus on its original part. Since ∂γ k /∂p k = γ k /p k , it is easily seen that each user's utility is maximized if each user is able to achieve the SINRγ, that is the unique 8 solution of the equation f (γ) = γf (γ). By Proposition 1, running iterations (17) until convergence is reached provides the set of spreading codes and MMSE receivers that maximize the SINRs for all the users. As a consequence, the utility of each user is maximized by adjusting transmit powers so that the optimized (with respect to spreading codes and linear receivers) SINRs equalγ. So far, we have shown how to set the transmit power, spreading code and receiver design to maximize utility at the Nash equilibrium. In order to show that a Nash equilibrium exists, we can use the same arguments of [8] and state that a unique Nash equilibrium point exists since each user's utility function is quasi-concave 9 in the transmit power p k and since the efficiency function is S-shaped.
Assume now that K ≤ N ; in this case, the spreading codes resulting from iterations (17) are orthogonal, i.e. the multiuser channel reduces to K parallel single-user channels. As a consequence, the SINR of each user is no longer affected by the strategies of the other users, and maximization of the utility of each user has no endangering effect on the utility achieved by the other users. In this scenario, thus, the noncooperative game clearly achieves Pareto optimality.
In practice, the above Nash equilibrium is reached through the following iterative algorithm. Given any set of transmit powers, iterations (17) are run in order to minimize system TMSE. After that, users adjust their transmit power in order to achieve the target SINR, using, e.g., the standard power control iterations as detailed in [6] . These steps are repeated until convergence is reached. 8 Uniqueness ofγ is ensured by the fact that the efficiency function is S-shaped [24] . 9 A function is quasi-concave if there exists a point below which the function is nondecreasing, and above which the function is nonincreasing.
V. A DISTRIBUTED POWER CONTROL ALGORITHM BASED ON LSA
The above arguments show that implementation of the proposed non-cooperative game, as well as of the game in [10] , needs a power control algorithm, such as the one outlined in [6] . Classical power control algorithms require knowledge of at least the uplink SINR for each user, or, alternatively, are implemented through iterative procedures [25] , [26] that suffer from slow convergence and excess steady-state error. In this paper, instead, we show that LSA may lead to power control algorithms that can be implemented in a distributed fashion and that require knowledge of the channel for the user of interest only. The results of this section refer to the case in which spreading code optimization is not performed, i.e. the case of utility maximization with respect to the choice of the linear uplink multiuser receiver and of the transmit power is considered.
As an introductory step to our algorithm, we begin by illustrating a simple power control algorithm derived from [13] . We have mentioned that in a large CDMA system the k-th user's SINR converges in probability to the solution to Eq. (1). Heuristically, this means that in a large system, and embracing the notation of the previous section, the SINR γ k is deterministic and approximately satisfies
Now, as noted in [13] , if all the users must achieve the same common target SINRγ, it is reasonable to assume that they are to be received with the same power, i.e. that the condition
is to be fulfilled. Substituting the above constraint into (20) and equating (20) toγ it is straightforward to come up with the following relationship:
wherein, we recall, α = K/N , and the inequality α < 1 + 1/γ must hold. Eq. (21), which derives from eq. (16) in [13] , gives a simple power control algorithm that permits setting the transmitted power for each user based on the knowledge of the channel gain for that user only. The above algorithm, however, does not take into account the situation in which, due to fading and path losses, some users end up transmitting at their maximum power without achieving the target SINR, and indeed our numerical results to be shown in the sequel will prove the inability of (21) to predict with good accuracy the actual power profile for the active users. In order to circumvent this drawback, we first recall that in [27] (see also [28] 
converges in probability, for increasing number of users K, to F
The above lemma states that if we sort a large number of identically distributed random variables, we obtain a vector that is approximately equal to the uniformly sampled version of the inverse of the common CDF of the random variables. Accordingly, in a large CDMA system each user may individually build a rough estimate of the fading coefficients in the network and be able to predict the number of users, say u 2 , that possibly will end up transmitting at the maximum power. Indeed, since, according to (21) each user is to be received with power P R , the estimate u 2 of the number of users transmitting at the maximum power is given by
with u(·) denoting the unit step-function. It is also obvious to assume that the users transmitting at P max will be the ones with the smallest channel coefficients, i.e. the squared channel gains of the users transmitting at the maximum power are well approximated by the samples F
−1 K− K
, with = K − u 2 + 1, . . . , K. As a consequence, the generic k-th user will be affected by u 1 = K − u 2 users that are received with power P R (these are the u 1 users with the strongest channel gains and that are able to achieve the target SINRγ), and by u 2 users that are received with power P max F
, with = K − u 2 + 1, . . . , K. Denoting by P k the received power for the k-th user, Eq. (20) can be now written as
Now, assuming for the moment that user k is able to achieve its target SINR, i.e. that P k = P R , the second summand at the denominator on the right-hand side (RHS) of the above equation can be approximated as
Substituting the above approximations into (23) and equating it to the target SINRγ we have
The above relation can now be solved numerically in order to determine the receive power P k for the k-th user 10 ; the actual transmit power for the k-th user is finally set according to the rule
Thus, the proposed algorithm may be summarized as follows. First, the number of users transmitting at the maximum power is estimated according to (22) . Then, the desired receive power for each user is computed solving (25) . Finally, the transmit power for the k-th user is determined according to relation (26) . Note that this algorithm requires knowledge only of the channel gain for the user of interest. In Appendix B we will briefly sketch a method to compute the inverse of the CDF of the channel gains taking into account both fading and path losses due to random users' location with respect to the AP.
VI. NETWORK PERFORMANCE PREDICTION IN A LARGE
CDMA SYSTEM In this section we show how LSA arguments can be used to derive the utility, transmit power and achieved SINR profile across users in a large CDMA system. Otherwise stated, we show here that, based on the knowledge of the parameters K and N , an estimate of the performance enjoyed by the ensemble of the users can be obtained. We begin by considering the case in which no spreading code optimization is used, and, then, we will relax this constraint.
A. Power control and linear MMSE detection
Assume that no spreading code optimization is performed and that an MMSE linear multiuser detector is used at the receiver. Equation (26) provides the transmit power of the k-th user, wherein P k is the solution of (25), and h 2 k is the square of the channel coefficient for the k-th user. Once equation (25) has been solved (note that this equation is to be solved just once), the set P of the powers transmitted by the active terminals is expressed as
With regard to the set of achieved SINRs, we have already commented on the fact that K−u 2 users are able to achieve the target SINRγ. Denoting by ξ i the SINR achieved by the user whose channel coefficient is h [i] , and letting ψ i denote the i-th element of the set P (i.e.
, it is easily shown that ξ i can be approximately obtained as the solution to (28) , shown at the top of this page. Accordingly, the set of achieved SINRs in the network will contain K − u 2 elements equal toγ and u 2 elements given by the solution to the above equation with i = K − u 2 + 1, . . . , K. Given the set of transmit powers and of achieved SINRs, the set of achieved utilities will contain the elements
B. Joint transmitter and receiver optimization with K ≤ N Let us consider now the case in which joint power control, spreading code optimization and linear receiver design is performed so as to maximize each user's utility. In this case, iterations (17) converge to a set of orthogonal codes, thus implying that the multiple-access channel reduces to the superposition of K parallel single-user channels. In this case, the k-th user SINR γ k is expressed as
As a consequence, since each user should achieve a target SINRγ, we have that the set P of the transmitted powers is expressed as
the set of the achieved SINRs, we have
, P max the generic element of P. Given ξ i and ψ i , the ensemble of achieved utilities can be computed as in (29) .
C. Joint transmitter and receiver optimization with K > N
Consider finally the case of an oversaturated CDMA system, i.e. the number of active users is larger than the processing gain. The following analysis refers to the case in which each user is able to achieve the target SINRγ; it is thus reasonable to assume that all the users are received with the same power, i.e.
Since a linear MMSE detector is used at the receiver, using standard linear algebra it is easily shown that the k-th user's SINR can be expressed as
On the other hand, it is well known [21] , [22] , [29] that in the case in which K > N and all the users are received with the same power, iterations (17) converge to a set of WelchBound-Equality (WBE) sequences, i.e. the limiting sequences are such that
SHP H
where, we recall, α = K/N . As a consequence, the data covariance matrix is expressed as
Substituting (36) into (34) and solving for P R we have
with α < 1+1/γ. Once P R has been computed from (37), the elements of the set of the transmitted powers are expressed as
and the elements of the set of the achieved utilities can be computed as in (29), with ξ i =γ, ∀i = 1, . . . , K.
VII. SOCIALLY OPTIMUM SOLUTION IN THE OVERSATURATED SCENARIO
Proposition 2 has shown that the Nash equilibrium of the proposed non-cooperative game is also Pareto-optimal in the case in which K ≤ N . For K > N, instead, the resource allocation strategy resulting from the said game is not on the Pareto-optimal frontier; the question thus arises as to how far the Nash equilibrium point lies from the optimal frontier. Usually, the Pareto-optimal frontier cannot be easily computed, and an alternative and viable approach is to consider the following social optimality problem
subject to the constraint of equal SINR, i.e. γ 1 = . . . = γ K = γ, so that fairness among users can be ensured. The above problem can be thus written as
with γ the common output SINR. Now, given the condition of equal SINR across users, it is natural to assume that the received powers are the same for all the users, i.e. (33) holds. Assuming that the optimal transmit power for all the users are smaller than P max , from (33) we have p i = P R /h 2 i , thus implying that the social optimality problem becomes
Since the received powers are the same for all the users, according to [21] , [29] , iterations (17) converge to a set of WBE sequences, which minimize the TMSE and, consequently, maximize the common SINR. Maximization of the common SINR with respect to the spreading codes and linear receivers of all the users can be thus carried out using iterations (17) after the condition (33) has been imposed. Let us denote by γ * the corresponding maximum common SINR; γ * is thus the SINR achieved by each user in a CDMA system wherein the spreading codes are WBE sequences, the receivers are MMSE detectors and each user is received with power P R . Accordingly, we have
Using (36), we obtain, after some algebra
Substituting the above relation into (41) the social optimality problem is finally written as
Taking the first order derivative of the above function with respect to γ we have
The solution of this equation represents the utility-maximizing target SINR for each user in a socially optimal context.
VIII. EXTENSIONS TO THE MULTI-CELL SCENARIO
So far, we have considered the uplink in a single-cell scenario, i.e. out-of-cell interference has been either neglected or included in the additive thermal noise. However, practical wireless networks typically have multiple cells, and users' utilities are affected also by the strategies of out-of-cell interference [30] . In what follows, we thus give a brief look at the multi-cell case showing how the results of the previous sections may be extended to this case, pointing out some differences with the single-cell scenario, and revealing some interesting open issues for future investigation.
Let us thus consider the uplink of a multi-cell DS/CDMA wireless data network. Denote by B the number of APs, and let h i,j be the real channel gain between the j-th user and the i-th AP; moreover, denote by a(j) the index of the AP assigned to the j-th user 11 . After chip-matched filtering and chip-rate sampling, the N -dimensional received data vector at the -th AP, say r , can be written as
The generic k-th user's data symbol is thus decoded at the a(k)-th AP, based on the decision rule
and the k-th user's utility can now be expressed as
11 Note that we are assuming here that each user is assigned to a certain AP, i.e. AP assignments have already taken place.
where, here, γ a(k),k is the k-th user' s SINR at the output of its linear receiver in its assigned AP, and can be expressed as
Of related interest is also the k-th user's MSE achieved by the detection rule (47); it is easy to show that this quantity can be expressed as 
is the vector corresponding to a linear MMSE receiver; and -p

Proof:
The proof follows along the same lines of that of Proposition 2 and is omitted for the sake of brevity.
The above result states that, if transmit power and linear receiver are to be allocated, a unique Nash-equilibrium point does exist also in a multi-cell system. Unfortunately, things are more involved as optimization with respect to spreading codes too comes into play. If the total number K of users in the network does not exceed the system processing gain N , then the following result holds. Achieved average utility versus number of active users for the proposed noncooperative game and for the games in references [8] and [10] . The system processing gain is N = 15.
Proposition 4: Consider a non-cooperative game wherein the k-th user's utility (48) is maximized with respect to the choice of the transmit power
p k ∈ [0, P k,max ], of the linear receiver d k ∈ R N and of the spreading code s k ∈ R N 1 ; assume that K ≤ N . A Nash equilibrium point (p * k , d * k , s * k ) for k = 1, . . . ,d k = √ p k h a(k),k M −1 a(k) s k , ∀k = 1, . . . , K , s k = d k / d k , ∀k = 1, . . . , K ; (51) and -p * k = min{p k , P k,max },the equation f (γ) = γf (γ), with f (γ) the derivative of f (γ).
This Nash equilibrium point is Pareto-optimal.
Proof: The proof is omitted for the sake of brevity.
Basically, the above result states that if K ≤ N a Nash equilibrium point does exist which is also Pareto-optimal; this point corresponds to the global minimum of the total MSE, which is a fixed point of iterations (51). However, further investigation is needed to establish whether other Nash equilibria may exist and, also, whether iterations (51) have some other fixed points corresponding to local minima of the total MSE. Likewise, the case in which K > N, which is the most relevant one in a multi-cell network, also merits some further investigation. These tasks are however beyond the scope of this paper, and a thorough investigation of the multi-cell scenario, which is certainly worthwhile, is left for future work.
IX. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section we present some simulation results that give insight into the performance of the proposed non-cooperative games, and, also, corroborate the validity of the analytical results of the previous sections.
We consider an uplink DS/CDMA system using uncoded BPSK and consider the corresponding efficiency function
We consider a processing gain N = 15, and assume that the packet length is M = 120; for this value of M the equation f (γ) = γf (γ) can be shown to admit the solutionγ = 6.689 = 8.25dB. A single-cell system is considered, wherein users may have random positions with a distance from the AP ranging from 10m to 1000m. The channel coefficient h k for the generic k-th user is assumed to be Rayleigh distributed with mean equal to d −1 k , with d k being the distance of user k from the AP. We take the ambient noise level to be N 0 = 10 −9 W/Hz, while the maximum allowed power P k,max is −25dBW. We present the results of averaging Average transmit power versus number of active users for the proposed noncooperative game and for the game in references [8] and [10] . The system processing gain is N = 15. [8] and [10] . The system processing gain is N = 15.
over 10000 independent realizations for the users locations, fading channel coefficients and starting set of spreading codes. More precisely, for each iteration we randomly generate an N × K-dimensional spreading code matrix with entries in the set −1/ √ N, 1/ √ N ; this matrix is then used as the starting point for the games that include spreading code optimization, and as the spreading code matrix for the games that do not perform spreading code optimization.
Figs. 2 -4 show the achieved average utility (measured in bits/Joule), the average user transmit power and the average achieved SINR at the receiver output versus the number of users, for the game in [10] , the game in [8] and for the non-cooperative game considered in Section IV of this paper. Inspecting the curves, it is seen that the proposed approach largely outperforms the games of [8] , [10] . As an example, it is seen that for K = 10 users the utility achieved by the proposed [8] and [10] . The system processing gain is N = 15.
game is about twice that achieved by the game in [10] , i.e. the same amount of energy can be used to transmit twice as much data. In particular, it is seen that for K ≤ N a very substantial performance gain can be obtained by resorting to spreading code optimization; indeed, when K ≤ N , users can be given orthogonal spreading codes, so that the multiaccess channel reduces to a superposition of K separate single-user AWGN channels. It is also seen from Fig. 4 that receivers achieve on the average an output SINR that is smaller than the target SINRγ: indeed, due to fading and distance path losses, achieving the target SINR would require some users to transmit at higher power than the maximum allowed power P k,max , and so these users are not able to achieve the optimal target SINR. As a confirmation of this, in Fig. 5 we show the fraction of users transmitting at the maximum power: as expected, the smaller fraction corresponds to the proposed game, but it is seen that this fraction is larger than zero.
In order to validate the LSA-based distributed power control algorithm of Section V, we consider a system with processing gain N = 128. Fig. 6 shows the transmitted power profile across users for the proposed distributed power control algorithm, for the algorithm derived by Eq. (16) in [13] (i.e., (21)), and for the conventional power control algorithm of [6] , which is non-adaptive and requires a substantial amount of prior information. It is seen that the proposed algorithm is capable of reproducing the optimal power profile with very good accuracy, while, on the contrary, the algorithm descending from paper [13] overestimates the required transmit powers and does not achieve good performance. While Fig. 6 shows the result of just one simulation trial (note however that a similar behavior has been observed in any considered case) the subsequent three figures show results coming from an average over 1000 independent realizations of the spreading codes, channel coefficients and users' locations. Figs. 7 -9 show the achieved average utility (measured in bits/Joule), the average user transmit power and the average achieved Average utility versus number of users for the proposed distributed algorithm based on LSA, for the centralized implementation of reference [10] and for the distributed algorithm based on the power control algorithm of reference [13] .
SINR at the receiver output versus the number of active users, for the conventional power control algorithms (i.e. for the non-cooperative game of [10] ), for the proposed algorithm, and for the power control algorithm derived in [13] . Results show that the proposed algorithm achieves a performance level practically indistinguishable from that of the standard algorithm, while the algorithm (21) achieves an utility much smaller. From Fig. 9 it is however seen that the algorithm (21) achieves an output SINR larger than that of the other algorithms: this should not be interpreted as a sign of good performance. Indeed, in the considered scenario the aim of the power control algorithm is to make each user operate at a SINR equal toγ. Finally, we consider an oversaturated system with processing gain N = 64, and number of users K = 70, so that K > N. In Fig. 10 we show the utility profile across [10] and for the distributed algorithm based on the power control algorithm of reference [13] . Fig. 9 . Average achieved SINR versus number of users for the proposed distributed algorithm based on LSA, for the centralized implementation of reference [10] and for the distributed algorithm based on the power control algorithm of reference [13] .
users for the non-cooperative game proposed in Section IV, in comparison with the utility profile predicted according to the content of Section VI.C and with the utility profile corresponding to the socially optimum solution with equal SINR constraint. It is seen that the performance loss incurred by the non-cooperative game in comparison with the socially optimum solution is quite negligible, and, also, that the LSAbased profile follows with good accuracy the actual utility profile. As a consequence, this plot corroborates the validity of our asymptotic analysis, that it is seen to be useful also when the system is actually "not so large".
X. CONCLUSION
In this paper the cross-layer issue of joint multiuser detection, power control, and spreading code optimization for wireless data networks has been addressed. First of all, building on the study [10] , we have proposed a more general noncooperative game wherein also spreading code optimization can be used to further increase the energy efficiency of CDMA-based wireless networks. We have shown that this game admits a unique Nash equilibrium point, that, for unsaturated systems, is also Pareto-optimal. For oversaturated CDMA systems, instead, we have shown that the socially optimum solution with equal SINR constraint exhibits a performance level practically coincident with that of the proposed non-cooperative game. Using LSA, and assuming that no spreading code optimization is performed, a new distributed power control algorithm that can be implemented based on the knowledge of the channel for the user of interest only has been proposed. Additionally, through LSA results we have been able to derive the network utility profile for a large CDMA system, for both the cases in which either spreading code optimization is carried out and in which it is not. Moreover, as an introductory step to the proposed non-cooperative game, we have clarified the relationship between the problems of SINR maximization and TMSE minimization in a synchronous CDMA system. Finally, we have also given a brief look at the multi-cell scenario, and, while extending some of our results to this case too, we have highlighted open issues worth investigating in future work. Numerical results have confirmed the superiority of the proposed non-cooperative game with respect to competing alternatives, as well as the accuracy of LSA-based theoretical formulas in describing the actual network performance. APPENDIX A Given the relation
we show here how to choose the constant µ k so that s k = 1. Let U ΛU T be the eigendecomposition of the matrix p k h 2 k DD T . Obviously, U is an orthonormal matrix whose columns are the eigenvectors of p k h 2 k DD T , and Λ is the corresponding diagonal eigenvalue matrix. Note that some of these eigenvalue will be zero for K < N. Now, letting u i and λ i denote the i-th column of U and the i-th diagonal element of Λ, respectively, and
it is easy to show that the above spreading code update can be rewritten as
From (53) 
APPENDIX B
In this appendix we show how the inverse CDF of the fading coefficients can be computed. In order to account for both fading and path loss, we assume that h ; typical values may be R a = 10m and R b = 500m. Finally n is a non-random exponent; in urban environments n is usually taken in the interval [2, 5] . It is easy to show that the CDF of h For the case n = 2, straightforward computations lead to
where erfc(·) is the complementary error function. The above equation should now be inverted numerically in order to obtain the inverse CDF. However, such an inversion may be computationally demanding, and, moreover, closed form expressions for the case n = 2 are not available.
An effective alternative approach is the following. The interval [R a , R b ] can be partitioned in a given number, say P , of smaller intervals, and the probability density function of d k can be approximated as
(56) As a consequence, we have
with d i = R a + i∆. Equation (57) is numerically invertible. Indeed, upon letting e −x = z, we have
It is easy to see that the above equation admits a unique solution z > 0, and any standard numerical equation solver routine can be used to find it; after that, we have x = − ln(z), and this equals F −1 h 2 k (y). In our simulations we have assumed R a = 10m, R b = 1000m and P = 200.
